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Leonard: Older Women and Pensions

OLDER WOMEN AND PENSIONS:
CATCH 22
Frances Leonard·
Pension funds in America represent one of the largest accumulations of capital in the history of the world.1 Private and
public sector funds exceed $550 billion, and are larger than the
combined GNP's of Great Britain and France.a Yet older American women, who comprise two-thirds of the retired population,
share substantially less of this great national resource by every
way of measurement. The result is that the poverty rate of these
women is sixty percent higher than that of men.a Thus, sex discrimination in pensions is a matter of profound concern to older
women, and of overriding importance to planners concerned
with the implications of our rapidly aging American population.
This paper will point out some of the ways that sex discrimination reduces the pension income received by women, and
what can be done about it. This will include a summary of the
problems faced by the woman earning her own pension check, 88
well as those faced by the woman dependent upon the retirement or survivor's benefit of another.

. .. . . .. ........

• Ms. Leonard is a practicing attorney in San Francisco, CA and legal counsel for
the Older Women's League Educational Fund (OWLEF). This paper was originally prepared for OWLEF (3800 Harrison St., Oakland, CA 94611) as Gray Paper No.4; Issues
for Action and is reprinted with their permission.
1. The pension funds are serious money, and are being taken seriously by the
financial world. Funds now own 20% of all public and privately financed securities in the
nation. Because unions and employers turn over control of the funds to banks or insurance companies, 25 institutional giants now control over one third of all public and private funds. The significance of this immense concentration of power is that economic
and social policy is heavily influenced by the investments made by these giants. ~ &
Barber, American Workers Own $550 Billion, in RETmEMENT INCOME: A REPORT FROM
THE PENSION RIGHTS CENTER (1979) (available from Pension Rights Center, Rm. 1019,
1346 Conn. Av. N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036) [hereinafter cited as lbmREMENT
INCOME).
2. [d. See also Raskin, Pension Funds Could Be the Unions' Secret Weapon, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, Dec. 31, 1979, 64, 64-67.
3. SUBCOMM. ON RETIREMENT INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT, SELECT COMM. ON AGING,
96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., WOMEN AND RETmEMENT INCOME PROGRAMS: CURRENT IssUES OF
EQUITY AND ADEQUACY 9 (Comm. Print 1979)(prepared by Cong. Research Serv., Library
of Cong.) [hereinafter cited as eRS REPORT).
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The pensio)[l "universe" of thousands of plans can be loosely
divided into those provided by public sector employment and
private sector employment." Public pensions are generally better
than private pensions, and almost all public employees are working under covered employment, while only one-half of the employees in the lprivate sector are working in jobs covered by a
pension plan. G Of course, plans vary in their provisions and
terms; however, the enactment in 1974 of minimum federal standards for private pension plans (ERISA) makes it possible to
discuss the plans as a group.
When a woman reaches retirement age, her income will
most likely not include a pension. Roughly one out of six women
over sixty-five reported to the Census Bureau that she received a
pension. And those pensions they do get are on the average
lower than mens': $5,582 to $7,566.6 This is because pension
plans reward th,e long term, steady worker with low mobility and
high earnings. To the extent a worker's employment pattern
deviates from this, the worker becomes a "loser" in the "pension
game":: Further, pension plans are computed on insurance principles. The cost of the plan will decrease as the number of forfeitures increas'e. Therefore, it is well for women and lower paid
men to recognize that to the extent they are set up to be the
losers under various programs, they are directly and deliberately
being made to subsidize the "winners", and there is nothing inadvertent or innocent about it.
Furthermore, cost of living increases are a rarity in private
sector pensions, and not universal in the public sector. This produces the well-known phenomenon of the inflation-devastated
pensioner on a fixed income, where a ten percent rate of inflation halves real income in seven years. Sadly, even inflation dis4. Social Security will only be mentioned in passing in this paper because sex discrimination in Social Security is treated elsewhere. See, e.g., OWLEF, Gray Paper No.2:
Issues for Action, Social Security: Adequacy and Equity for Older Women (1979).
5. Rich, Pensions: Too Few, Too Small for Most, in RETIREMENT INCOME, supra note
I, at 1, 16.
6. BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, No. 118, CURRENT POPULATION REPORT (1977).
7. For an excellent study of "winners" and "losers" in this most important game, see
TASK FORCE ON

SION

SEX DISCRIMINATION, CIVIL RIGHTS DIY., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE PEN·

GAME: AMERICAN PENSION

SYSTEM FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF THE AVERAGE WOMAN

(1979).
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criminates by sex due to women's greater longevity. One wonders if tolerance of the fixed retirement income is rooted in the
lower male life expectancy. Cost of living indexing should be recognized as an issue of major importance to oJder women.
The impact of pension discrimination follows the woman in
her various roles. The very person most expected to require income in old age (because of longevity) is handed a pension obstacle course of ominous dimensions. What follows, then, is a review of the pension reducing factors lurking in almost every
choice a woman can make-from homemaker to high paid
worker; from lifetime marriage to divorce.
I. THE HOMEMAKER
Homemakers comprise the largest group of workers in the
country. Unlike some other nations (i.e., Canada, France, Germany, England and Sweden), the United States does not consider homemaking a pensionable activity. Here, pensions are
based on revenue-generating occupations, and homemaking is
not given recognition as such.
Two approaches develop when discussions of mitigating the
impoverished old age of career homemakers arise. The first ap. proach is tied to dependency, the prevailing pattern of the traditional homemaker role. Under this tack, a wage earner's benefits
are increased in recognition of the dollar value of the homemaker's efforts to the employer's enterprise. But note that to
benefit under this type of solution, the homemaker must still be
married to the wage earner upon his retirement.
The better approach would abolish the concept of dependency and develop pension plans that vest in the homemaker's
own right. In addition to the basic fairness and dignity of this
approach, it obviously is expedient in this age of frequent divorce for the worker in the home to protect her retirement years
independently of her spouse's benefits.
Discussion in depth of various proposals is beyond the scope
of this paper. Briefly, they include splitting income credits for
Social Security, establishing separate retirement credits with the
employed spouse's employer, direct federal pensions for homemakers, and homemakers' Individual Retirement Accounts
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(IRA's) not tied to their spouse's IRA-'s.
The last proposal would be logistically- the easiest to implement. Under a tax-sheltered IRA, a homemaker could achieve a
retirement income double the yield of an ordinary savings program. Homemakers argue that they file joint tax returns, so
should qualify for joint tax credits. Homemaker's IRA's are attacked by those who feel they would subsidize wealthier families, who can afford a stay-at-home spouse and reap the tax benefits. This argument ~hould be strongly countered by women
who well know tlb.e hard work they do in the home.
In addition to receiving no pension credits for work done in
the home, the homemaker who was employed before leaving to
raise a family is devastated by current methods of computing
Social Security benefits. She may have paid the highest contributions for the full vesting period, but when her turn comes to
draw benefits, she will draw a minimal amount. This is because
her "zero income" years will be included in the computation.
Great Britain and Quebec have recently reformed their programs to rectify this inequity.8
.

.

Whether or not Americans should continue to restrict ret~ement benefits to revenue producing work is a major policy
qu~stion. If it is agreed that homemakers provide a service to
the nation of incalculable value, then it is imperative that
policymakers eljminate the disincentives to that role-including
pension disqualifications that penalize or preclude combining
paid work with home work, and retirement income concepts that
utterly disregard the years of hard work in the home.
But if, as a matter of thoughtful consideration, our society
determines to reject the role of homemaker and child-rearer as a
worthwhile vocation and suitable for adults, then let's make the
judgment emphatically clear to young women from their earliest
days. Let's educate them for the purpose of fulltime, permanent
participation in the paid workforce, and discourage homemaking
or child-rearing as a choice.
8. Kreitler-Kirkpat;rick, A Comparison of Social Security Provisions Benefiting Women, 2 AGING AND WORK 269, 270 (1979).
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II. THE EMPLOYED WOMAN
Older women have a great interest in the sex discriminatory
provisions of pension plans, which serve to reduce their retirement income. Congress in 1974 passed major legislation regulating private pension plans (ERISA}-but chose not to make it
mandatory for a private employer to offer a plan at all. Because
most people over sixty-five are women, mandatory pensio~8 are
an issue of first importance to older women. Service industries
and small employers are the least likely to have plans. Because
employment discrimination forces women workers into these
very areas, fewer than half as many women as men (twenty-one
percent of women to forty-nine percent of men) working in the
private sector are working in covered employment.s
Further, of those women working in covered employment,
very few will ever qualify for a pension check. This is because of
several provisions common to most plans, both public and private, that weigh against work patterns typical of women.
A. ERISA STANDARDS
The Employees Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
was enacted by Congress in 1974 to establish minimum standards for private pension plans. Although a much-needed reform
act, unfortunately women are disproportionately disadvantaged
by almost every qualification. This is because ERISA did little
more than codify minimal standards which plans must meet,
based on traditional pension "values". Historically, in this country these values'reward the long-term, steady, well-paid worker,
and are reflected in pension plans in these ways:

Age exclusions. ERISA permits employers to exclude from
coverage people under twenty-five years of age, and, under most
plans, those persons hired within five years of the normal retirement age set by the plan. These age exclusions work to "disqualify large numbers of women from participating in a plan, because age twenty to twenty-four represents the highest
proportion of women in the workplace. In 1978, over sixty-eight
percent of women aged twenty to twenty-four were employed; it
9. CRS

REPORT,
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is projected that this will exceed seventy-six percent by 1985. 10
After age twenty-five, women's participation sharply drops off as
women leave to assume family responsibilities. Similarly, an
older woman entering the workplace because the divorce or
death of spouse caused her to do so quite late in life would be
excluded. Thus the age exclusions at both ends of her life penalize a woman for her middle years of family commitment-a disqualification that falls upon very few men.

Vesting. A person must work long enough for one employer,
or forfeit the pension rights accrued. This is known as the "vesting" requirement. Most plans under ERISA require ten years of
employment before vesting occurs. ERISA's tolerance of the ten
year period eliminates from private pension eligibility most of
the women workers who choose to leave the workforce to raise
families. 11
Part-time exclusion. Many women do manage to be "longterm employees" by working part-time while caring for their
families. This predominantly female employment pattern
(thirty-three percent of women to twelve percent of men)12 also
fails to qualify under most private plans. ERISA permits em- •
ployers to exclude persons who work less than one thousand
hours per year, or nineteen hours per week. The effect of this is
to remove yet another large group of employed women from the
"pension game."
Break-in-service. Although ten years may be required for
vesting, the plan must permit workers who leave and return, the
opportunity to vest. But if the "break-in-service" equ8ls or exceeds the last period of employment, the worker forfeits all prior
credits toward vesting. A woman who leaves her job to have children, and then returns to her old job may have to start her vesting period anew. So yet another method of combining work and
family has the effect of removing women from the pool of future
10. rd. at 41-42••

11. On the average, men stay on one job 4.5 years, and women about two years. A
Special News Report on People and their Jobs in Offices, Fields and Factories, Wall st.
J., May I, 1979, at 1, col. 5. Lobbyists on behalf of occupations with inherently high
mobility, such as engineers, are energetically campaigning to lower the ERISA vesting
period.
12. CRS· Report, supra note 3, at 42.
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pension beneficiaries.

Backloading. The practice known as "backloading" allows a
plan to increase retirement credit in later years of employment.
This rewards the worker who spends a long working life in one
place. It condemns the worker not fitted to that employment
pattern to a lower retirement check. And once aga41, the rewarded work pattern is mostly that of males.
Portability. If workers could take pension credits "with
them" when they change jobs, as is done under Social Security,
mobile women workers would benefit greatly. But the logistics of
accomplishing this in the private sector are enormous.
Pension fund insurance. It is clear that any woman wishing
to devote full or part time care to the home will be virtually
eliminated from the pool of pension beneficiaries. But for many
women who do conform to the male work-pattern, there is a
nasty surprise. When ERISA was enacted, Congress set up a
pension fund insurance program, along the same idea as the federal deposit insurance for private bank accounts. Yet a major
exemption from protection under the insurance is the worker in
the small professional office. The nurse, legal secretary or bookkeeper may achieve a vested status, yet find their fund failed at
the end. They will be uninsured and out of luck.13
B.

INTEGRATION AND OFF-SET

Integration. The working woman' faces another pension reducing measure because of the likelihood of her being among the
lowest paid workers. Integration means that the private plan is
"integrated" with the Social Security benefit. It is especially vicious to lower paid workers. For example, a plan would be permitted to define its pension benefit when combined with Social
Security as amounting to fifty-five percent of the worker's last
wage. A lower paid worker may find that her Social Security
check is fifty-five percent of her last wage. Her pension check
would be zero. Thus, any worker earning less than the Social
Security wage base can end up with no pension check, under ex13. Fitzgerald, The Pension Stakes: What it Tokes to Win, in RImREMENT INCOME,
supra note I, at 20.
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isting regulations. H It is estimated that twenty-five percent of
workers under a plan are now "integrated out" of a benefit. III
And because women's wages average sixty percent of men's for
the same work, those integrated out are disproportionately female. 1S Note that these are vested workers-the seeming "winners" of the game-the long distance runners who believe until
the day they retire that they will have a pension plus Social
Security!
Off-set. In an "off-set", it is· Social Security which reduces
its benefits. Any recipient of a public pension must reduce, dollar for dollar, any benefit received as a dependent on Social Security. Because most people entitled to the dependent's
(spousal) benefit are women, this has disproportionately reduced
the retirement income of women. Teachers, government clerks
and the rest of the large body of women working in lower paid
government jobs are affected by this off-set.

Private plans are growing fast in the retirement picture.
The loopholes which work against the employed woman must be
plugged. Because two-thirds of the retired population is female,
this issue is one that all social planners should address as our
population contilllues to age. The above-described difficulties are
examples of so-called "sex-neutral" provisions in the law that
have a discriminatory "impact" on women. This means that although the ERISA regulations just described apply to both men
and women, they weigh more heavily on women because of predominant work patterns, and not because the enactment itself
uses discriminatory language. Since recent Supreme Court decisions tolerate this type of sex discrimination, perhaps older women's advocates should concentrate their efforts on legislative
reform rather than constitutional litigation. A further point for
employed women to consider is that ERISA standards are mini14. By 1981 the Social Security wage base will be $29,000. The Congressional Research Service estimated that in 1974, 60% of all private plans were integrated. CRS
Report, supra note 3, at 50. The percentage has greatly increased since then, because
employers favor those plans. Louis Harris Assoc., 1979 Study of American Attitutes Toward Pensions and Retirement: A Nationwide Survey of Employees, Retirees, and Business Leaders (public opinion poll) [hereinafter cited as Harris Poll].
15. Blumenthal, Lower Paid Workers Losing Pensions, in RlmREMENT INCOME,
supra note I, at 6.
16. CRS REPORT, supra note 3, at 50.
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mums. Any pension plan is free to exceed the standards. A plan
can, if it chooses, vest in one year, fully cover part-time workers,
exclude no age group, and so forth. Therefore, the quickest way
for employed women to benefit themselves is at the bargaining
table at negotiating time.
C.

SEX-BASED ACTUARIAL TABLES

Unlike the "sex-neutral" problems noted above, an explicit
sex-based classification can be unlawful. A recent Supreme
Court decision has been helpful to some employed women. In
City of Los Angeles v. Manhart. the Court decreed that sex, based actuarial tables violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
when they are used to increase the pension contribution taken
from the paycheck.I? The Court expressly did not decide that
use of sex-based actuarial tables to reduce a pension when received was prohibited by law. Because the majority of private
plans do not require employee contributions, the apparent victory is somewhat hollow.
The use of sex-based actuarial tables to reduce women's
pensions when received is pervasive. This is justified by insurers
on the basis of women's greater longevity.I8 Group in~urance,
which is what a pension fund is, always factors in the unequal
risks in any group. The high risk participants are always "subsidized" by the low risk ones. Actuaries have identified dozens of
risk factors related to longevity-among them race, marital s~
tus and smoking habits. Yet only the gender difference is used
by the pension actuaries. It should be noted that' the insurance
industry actively opposes unisex tables because of cost.I9 But decisions which will affect the income of the majority of the retired
population should be made with other than a market mentality.
In the meantime, women should avoid annuities whenever they
have the choice of placement of their funds. For example, in an
17. 435 U.s. 702 (I977).
18. TASK FORCE ON SEX DISCRIMINATION, CIVIL RIGHTS DlV., u.s. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
COMMENTS TO THE
COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS ON THE CONSULTATION ON DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MINoRITIES AND WOMEN IN PENSIONS, AND HEALTH LIFE, AND DISABn.1TY
INSURANCE 23 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TASK FORCE REPORT].
19. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 18, at 23. H. Denenberg, An Overview Report:
Discrimination in the Insurance Marketplace and in the Insurance Business-With Primary Emphasis on Life, Health, Disability and Pensions 23 (April 24, 1978) (presentation to the U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights).

u.s.
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IRA one can purchase a savings plan, bond or an annuity. If an
annuity is chosen, a woman's dollar will not buy her the same
monthly check as a man's dollar will. This is not true of dollars
invested elsewhere.
III. THE SURVIVOR
Women should fight the stereotype of dependency, and the
harmful even disastrous consequences of being utterly dependent upon the income of another. It has often been said that a
dependent woman is one man away from poverty. But it must
not be forgotten that the victims of economic dependency are
very much with us, and with only fifty percent of women employed today,20 the dependency problem is not going to disappear soon. For this reason, reformers sensitive to the impact of
pensions on older women should oppose proposals aimed at
eliminating spousal and survivor's benefits without alternative
proposals to provide for women who are dependent. For example, in response to pressure from single workers, it was recommended that Social Security phase out its spousal and survivor's
benefits.:n The seeming economic parity in this plan would come
at the expense of older women-women who have been muscled
out of the chance of obtaining a pension in their own right by
the factors already discussed.
A.

THE SPOUSAL BENEFIT

A woman dependent on her husband's earings will be concerned with two elements of his retirement plan: first, does it
pay a spousal (or dependent's) benefit while he is alive, and second, will there be a survivor's benefit to her after his death?
At retirement, a couple will receive joint benefits that are
either more than (under Social Security) or less than (under a
pension) a single retiree. This difference comes about because of
divergent pension philosophies. Because of the "adequacy" notion. in the social planning that went into Social Security, a
couple will receive a joint Social Security benefit that exceeds a
single retiree's. But strict adherence to insurance principles
20. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS

155, Table C (1979).
21. CRS REPORT, supra note 3, at 34-35.
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leads to the opposite result under employer pension plans. Pension plans offer a "joint and survivor's" option, which means the
retiree can elect to take full monthly checks which will end at
his or her death, or a lower monthly check of which a portion
will continue to be paid the survivor. The effect of this election
is to reduce the income of the couple below that of the single
worker. Recent studies have questioned the legitimacy of the insurance principles which bring about this result.22
Eliminating the practice of reducing the pension check
when the joint and survivor option is elected would do more
than increase older women's standard of living derivative upon
their husband's check. It would greatly reduce the temptation of
the couple to "take a chance" that she will die first, thus electing
to take the higher income for the worker's life, with nothing for
the survivor in the way of benefits.

B.

SURVIVOR'S BENEFITS

The widow will most likely receive no pension benefits after
her husband's death. Mandatory survivor's benefits are rare,
under either governmental or private plans. Moreover, the usual
practice is to reduce the survivor's check only if the dependent
is the survivor. If the worker survives, the joint check is not reduced at all. This is an issue of some importance to older women, who wonder at the inequity of considering one half a joint
·pension adequate for a widow, while a whole joint benefit is continued for the widower.
ERISA compels private plans to award a survivor's benefit
of no less than one-half of the retiree's benefits, unless this option is rejected in writing by the worker at retirement time.
Formerly, when a worker retired, he or she was automatically
awarded a single-life annuity. If a joint-life annuity was available at all, it was incumbent on the worker to opt in. Now, under
ERISA and the big public plans, it is the reverse. But the big
catch is this: the option is the retiring worker's alone. The
spouse need never even be informed of the decision, let alone be
asked to ratify it. More than sixty-four percent of Civil Service
(federal), thirty-one percent of Foreign Service, and ninety-four
percent of the Military have opted out of survivor's benefits as
22. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 18, at 10-11.
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of February 1979.28 The "opt-out" rate in the private sector cannot be presumed to be any rosier.
Obviously, this represents a problem of stunning proportions. For dependents of many retirees, the impact is cushioned
by the Social Security benefit. But federal Civil Service retirees,
along with some local government units (i.e., school districts),
are not covered by Social Security. When these employees opt
out, they leave their survivors with no pension benefit at all.
There is legislation pending in the 96th Congress to amend
ERISA and various federal programs to require the written consent of the dependent before the retiree can opt out. 2 ' These
reforms are opposed by the insurance industry on the basis of
the added expense.215 Rather than encumber the plan with this
small duty, the industry would stand aside as millions of older
women learn for the first time upon their JlUsband's death, that
they have been "elected out" of any interest in future pension
payments.
Legislative reform requiring the written cons~nt of the dependent before the option is taken is an important first step, but
does not go far enough. It can be imagined that poorly-informed
consent, or coercion, or misjudgment, will lead many dependents
to sign away their rights. Mandatory survivor's benefits should
be part of every plan; the joint-life annuity should yield as much
income as the single-life annuity; and the practice of cutting in
half the survivor's benefit only if the dependent is the survivor
should be discontinued.
Another trap for the dependent is this: ERISA allows survivor's benefits to forfeit if the worker dies before retirement. This
could happen to a fully vested worker, within a year or two of
retirement age. His widow. will get nothing. ERISA does permit
23. Fact Sheet on Bills Introduced by Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D., CO.)(1979) (isby Rep. Schroeder's office).
24. H.R. 2817, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (Schroeder) (Military Retirement); H.R.
2857, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)(Schroeder) (Foreign Service Retirement); H.R. 2878,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (~chroeder) (Civil Service Retirement); S. 209, 96th Cong.,
1st Seas. (1979) (Williams)(ERISA).
25. Beshgetoor, Insurance Association Opposes Increased Survivor's Protection, in
RETumMENT INCOME, supra note I, at 9.
8Ued
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a plan to contain a pre-retirement joint and survivor option-but this will further reduce the already reduced joint and
survivor annuity-even if the worker survives after retirement.
The disincentives to this choice are therefore severe. This leaves
the middle-aged homemaker dangerously unprotected in her
pre-retirement years. A particularly vicious angle to this "early
survivor's election is that if this choice is made, and the worker
dies of natural causes within two years of making the election,
the benefits are forfeited. This is because a worker who had received "bad news" might try to provide for his or her family by
making this election, thus unsportingly creating, in insurance
parlance, a "negative selection". Experts say that ailing workers
have been known to slam their cars into bridge abutments in
order to provide for their dependents-because accidental
deaths do not cause a forfeit!28
Also of importance is what becomes of the survivor's benefit
if the widow should remarry. Some federal plans such as Social
Security and some federal retirement plans allow the benefits to
continue if she remarries after age sixty. Under other federal
plans and almost all private plans the survivor's benefits forfeit
upon remarriage at any age.
The President has commissioned a two-year study on pension reforms, and included on the agenda is survivor's benefits.
The Commission on Pensionsl7, must be made aware of the fact
that most people over sixty-five are women, and because most of
these women are not entitled to a pension in their own right, the
issue of survivor's benefits affects more people of retirement age
than do straight pension rights. .
IV. THE DIVORCED WOMAN

There is a growing recognition of the economic partnership
,of the marital unit among policy-makers. IS The earned compen26.
27.
sent its
28.

Fitzgerald, supra note 13, at 20.
Chaired by C. Peter McColough. Chairperson of Xerox; the commission will prefinal report to the President in February 1981.
These bills [see note 24 supra)
are based upon the premise that marriage is an economic partnership and the income earned is joint marital property. The
spouse makes a contribution toward the employee's ability to
earn the wage and consequently receive the pension. There-
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sation during the course of the marriage is attributable to the
efforts of the unit, and pension rights are recognized as part of
the compensation, not a mere gratuity.
A significant number of women will face divorce after age
forty-five.~9 The two major assets owned by the couple divorcing
after a long marriage will most likely be the home and the pension fund. Yet Social Security alone automatically benefits the
divorced wife and even then, only after a marriage of ten years. 30
To date, there is no law compelling ERISA plans or public programs to cover a divorced spouse.
There are two ways for a divorced woman to share in the
pension asset. One is by alimony, and the other is by property
settlement. It is important to note the distinction. Alimony is
awarded at the discretion of the court, based on the situation at
hand, and in almost all jurisdictions, is no longer a right. What
the property rights of the spouses are depends upon the laws of
their state, and, unfortunately, these laws are far from
uniform. 3t

A.

DEFINING THE MARITAL PROPERTY

The best legal position for the divorced spouse is the California recognition that even unvested pension rights are viewed
as marital property and subject to division upon dissolution.32
Unfortunately, the California position has been hampered by
fore, a spouse married during the working years should be entitled to a portion of the retirement benefits payable at
retirement.
125 Congo Rec. 1069 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Schroeder).
29. PENSION RIGHTS CENTER, PENSION FACI'S 2, at 4 (1979).
30. Further, this is only for divorced women. The exclusion of divorced males has
been upheld by the Supreme Court. The divorced woman receives 50% of the retiree's
benefit, as does the current spouse. Like the wife, the divorced woman must await the
retirement of the worker before her benefits begin. There is legislation pending to decrease the required years of marriage. H.R. 874, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)(Yates).
31. The Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress found "some
States do not give divorce courts jurisdiction to divide marital property. Other States use
a title theory of division. Some States provide for equitable division of the property. Yet
other States are community property States. Some States consider retirement benefits
gratuities rather than property. Other States consider retirement benefits to be property." CRS REPORT, 3upra note 3, at 77.
32. In Re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 941, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633
(1976).
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less progressive thinking in Congress and the United States Supreme Court. In early 1979, the United States Supreme Court
disagreed with the California Supreme Court, and held in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo 33 that Railroad Retirement benefits are
not community property and therefore are not subject to the
equal division the California court would have made. The U.S.
Supreme Court distinguished between alimony and marital
property rights, and this distinction remains important.
Originally viewed as a major setback, the Hisquierdo decision has been applied by the California courts quite narrowly.
Whether or not certain sections in ERISA would require a similar determination for private plans has not been decided by the
U.S. Supreme Court. Courts in California and across the nation
are reaching different results under similar facts. The rights involved are weighty ones: can a plan be garnished to satisfy marital property settlement?; can a fund be forced to issue two pension checks?; are there marital property rights to survivor's
benefits as well as to retirement benefits?; must a right be vested
before it is divisible?; can a divorced spouse receive her share
before the worker retires?; and more.
Basic rights, such as property interests in a major asset
(such as the pension fund) should not be unevenly available to
older women, depending on the part of the country they live in.
Where a major asset will be available to an older woman upon
divorce only if she resides in a progressive area of the country,
the inequities exceed tolerable levels. The courts are chaotically
engaged in statutory interpretation, and the best place to resolve
statutory problems is in the legislatures themselves. There is reform legislation before Congress now. 34 If passed, this will be
helpful to divorced spouses of federal employees, as they will
draw automatic retirement and survivor's benefits. The proposed ERISA amendments, however, do not do this for divorced
spouses of private pension beneficiaries. These amendments will
33. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
34. H.R. 1844, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (Edwards) (Railroad Retirement); H.R.
1867, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (Leach) (Civil Service); H.R. 2472, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979) (Whitehurst) (Military Retirement): H.R. 2817, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)
(Schroeder) (Military Retirement): H.R. 2818, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (Schroeder)
(Civil Service): H.R. 2857, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (Schroeder) (Foreign Service
Retirement).
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be very helpful to the divorced residents of progressive states
where marital pl'Operty rights in the pension fund are recognized. But another solution will have to be found for residents of
states whose courts are not so inclined.
Further, the difference between retirement income and survivor benefits has legal importance. Even California courts do
not recognize community property interests in survivor's benefits. The bills amending federal retirement programs recognize
this, and provide for rights in both types of benefits.

B.

DIVIDING THE PENSION

Another important consideration is the way the pension
fund will be divided in the property settlement. If there are sufficient assets, it may be preferable to assign a value to the pension rights, and allocate and award a dollar amount to the
spouse at the time of dissolution. When this is not possible, the
court can order either the fund trustees or the retiree to pay
one-half to the divorced spouse each month at retirement time.
The former is obviously preferable because it is more certain,
and has the considerable advantage of not continuing the dependency relationship long after the marriage is over. Fund operators oppose trustee payment as greatly increasing their overhead.
Divorced working women are disadvantaged by the Individual Retirement (IRA) regulations. Under IRA, persons can put
aside a portion of their income as tax-deferred savings for retirement. IRA's are a major tax shelter by which workers can shelter
up to fifteen percent or $1,500 of their income, whichever is
lower. But alimony income is not counted into the income for
IRA deductions, even though it is taxed for income tax purposes.
Thus a worker with alimony and earned income will pay income
tax on the total but can shelter only the earnings. This reduces
the amount of taxable income a divorced woman can shelter.35
The problems facing divorced women are the most complex
in the pension reform field, and because of conflicting laws, will
be the most difficult to resolve. This cause will be further bur35. H.R. 3250, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) (Kemp) would eliminate this inequity.
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dened by the opposition of plan trustees, plan participants, and
wives of retirees. It is here that women must be particularly
alert to the need for unity. Conflict between older divorced women and married women must be condemned as defeating the
recognition of property rights for all women. So too should retirees and former spouses unite over the important issue of divided
pension payments being paid separately by the plan itself.

V. EDUCATE, LEGISLATE, LITIGATE AND NEGOTIATE
A.

EDUCATE

Pension funds control billions of dollars, yet the return on
investments is scandalously low. Funds are heavily into common
stocks, and in recent years the top fund investors averaged only
a one percent return on these equity investments. ss Why on
earth do the leading financial experts in the country invest so
poorly? One commentator says: "If the people who contribute to
pension funds listen and look, they will find their money is being
used to build economic empires. They will learn they are receiving very low returns on their investment."S7 The control over
other corporations gained through the use of the worker's
money, is then exercised in ways that are often against the interests of the worker. s8 Workers are urged to insist on having a say
in the placement of their funds. Bankers, of course, vigorously
oppose this.
The point for older women is this: now, at the very beginning of the "social investment" debate, women must make their
interests known. Pension activists must watch out for occasions
where this is debated, and ensure that women's issues are on the
agenda. Women working in large companies or unions must
come to recognize their unified clout. Their collective voice could
cause their plan's funds to be placed constructively, and if the
36. Sen. H. Metzenbaum, Workers Should Demand Pension Fund Control, in REsupra note 1, at 10.
37. [d. In his article urging workers to wake up to the situation, Sen. Metzenbaum
referred to one fund manager which owned a controlling interest in 143 major
corporations.
38. "We can no longer tolerate this situation of using worker-produced capital
against ourselves." Raskin, supra note 2, at 66 (quoting Lloyd McBride, President of the
U.S. Steelworkers of America). "We shall be pursuing every available means to ensure
that pension money is invested creatively and constructively, to the benefit of workers
and fair employers." [d. at 64 (quoting Lane Kirkland, President, AFL·CIO).
TIREMENT INCOME,
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fund holds controlling power in other corporations, use it to upgrade the pensions there.
It is discouraging that a major pension survey commissioned
by the insurance giant Johnson & Higgins, and conducted by
Louis Harris, Assoc., practically ignored pension issues that affect older women. 39 Out of 137 principal questions, not one explored survivors', dependents' or divorced persons' benefits. Survivors' benefits came up only three of four times in subparts of
questions. Further, this study was regarded as major and extensive, and is being heavily used by policy makers. Yet those surveyed included only employers and employees. Persons dependent on survivors or spousal benefits were not included in the
sample, even though this group is numerically the largest segment of retired Americans.

B.

LEGISLATE

There are close to 100 bills before the 96th Congress which
are designed to improve pensions for women. The key to their
passage rests in pressure upon members of Congress to support
them. One member, Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D. Colo), a pension
reform advocate, reported recently that the outlook for most of
them is unfavorable. The importance of pressure groups is illustrated by the progress of two of her bills: one, (H.R. 2857) which
is moving, has 8lIl active group working for it-Foreign Service
wives. One which is not, (H.R. 2817) has an active group working
against it-Military husbands.
Older women cannot wait for Congress to do what is right.
Pensions, both public and private, are especially subject to legislative reform because the statutory frameworks are already enacted. Letter writing, testifying, and supporting helpful amendments should be very useful.
C.

LITIGATE

A good place for individual litigation is in marital property
settlements. If a state has a harsh rule on pension rights, and
does not recognize the fund as divisible marital property, then
creative alimony settlements should be considered. For example,
39. Harris .Poll, supra note 14.
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perhaps an annuity could be purchased as part of alimony, as
distinct from property, which would yield an income upon maturity equal to the denied pension benefit.
On a broader base, pension reform litigators should look to
the federal enactments (Equal Pay Act, Title VII, Equal Employment Opportunity Act, and even the Constitution) for assistance. State law varies widely, but in progressive jurisdictions
the federal statutes may be supplemented or surpassed.

D.

NEGOTIATE

Women employees should get on the agenda at contract negotiation time. Unions should be educated to the requirements
of their women members, and make these the "bottom line" at
the bargaining table. It is important to remember that the ERISA (dis)qualifications outlined in this paper are minimum standards under federal law. A plan cannot, for example, require a
vesting period of fifteen years, a minimum coverage age of
thirty, or a "part-time" definition of thirty hours work per week.
On the other hand, it can provide a one-year vesting period, no
minimum age, ~d cover all part-time employees, regardless of
hours worked.
In addition to insisting on a good pension plan at bargaining
time, ifis appropriate for prospective employees to question the
personnel officer about the plan in force. If a job is turned down
because of unsatisfactory coverage (especially appropriate in the
case of a permanent "part-time" job: twenty years with the company, Tuesdays and Thursdays = no pension), let the interviewer know why, and follow-up with a letter to the
management.

.. .... .........

Fringe benefits are rapidly expanding as a method of compensation. As part of this strong trend, pension funds are now a
major component of the nation's economy. In addition, the importance of pensions as the major source of retirement income
increases annually. As the major segment of the retired population, older women should act to protect their interests in this
critical national resource.
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